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Restore seq number check of post-handshake ClientHello msg

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The check was wrongly removed by the commit
"ssl_tls12_server.c: Move ClientHello message_seq adjustment".

Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Ronald Cron
2026-03-10 10:15:42 +01:00
parent d6977afbd8
commit 7476e4067d
1 changed files with 36 additions and 23 deletions
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library/ssl_msg.c
+25 -12
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@@ -3261,23 +3261,24 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD;
} }
/*
* When establishing the connection, the client may go through a series
* of ClientHello and HelloVerifyRequest requests and responses. The
* server intentionally does not keep trace of these initial round
* trips: minimum allocated ressources as long as the reachability
* of the client has not been confirmed. When receiving the "first
* ClientHello" from server perspective, we may thus need to adapt
* the next expected `message_seq` for the incoming and outgoing
* handshake messages.
*/
if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO && if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO &&
ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
&& ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
#endif #endif
) { ) {
/*
* When establishing the connection, the client may go through
* a series of ClientHello and HelloVerifyRequest requests and
* responses. The server intentionally does not keep trace of
* these initial round trips: minimum allocated ressources as
* long as the reachability of the client has not been
* confirmed. When receiving the "first ClientHello" from
* server perspective, we may thus need to adapt the next
* expected `message_seq` for the incoming and outgoing
* handshake messages.
*/
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = recv_msg_seq; ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = recv_msg_seq;
ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = recv_msg_seq; ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = recv_msg_seq;
@@ -3289,6 +3290,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2,
sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2);
} else if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) {
/* In case of a post-handshake ClientHello that initiates a
* renegotiation check that the handshake message sequence
* number is zero.
*/
if (recv_msg_seq != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: "
"%u (expected 0)",
recv_msg_seq));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
}
}
} }
if (ssl->handshake != NULL && if (ssl->handshake != NULL &&